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Of Fortunes and Fortune: 




Many Americans believe that a free market economy effectively 
rewards its participants their just deserts.  This is so, it will be said, 
because in a free market hard workers will earn more than lazy 
workers, and entrepreneurs with good ideas will fare better than 
entrepreneurs with lousy ideas.  On this way of viewing things, 
government interferences in market outcomes are unjust, since 
such interferences presumably take away money from people who 
deserve it and give money to people who do not deserve it.  
According to this view, then, justice requires a “hands off” 
approach to market outcomes—in short, justice requires a “laissez-
faire” economic system.   
In this article, I criticize this view.  I argue instead that 
interferences with market outcomes needn’t trespass on deserts, 
and that some forms of interference, far from being unjust, are in 
fact required by justice in order to provide all citizens with secure 
access to a life of dignity.  In particular, I will argue that justice 
requires a publicly funded “social safety net” consisting of 
programs such as unemployment insurance, state-supplied 
pensions for the elderly (e.g. Social Security), measures to ensure 
that health care is affordable, public primary and secondary 
schools, financial aid for higher education, food vouchers for those 
with food insecurity, child protective services, and the like. 
My reply to the laissez-faire defender, in essence, is this:  well-
off people who complain that it is wrong to tax them in order to 
fund a social safety net are overlooking a key fact, namely, they are 
overlooking the fact that their prosperity was not wholly self-made.  
Instead, their prosperity is in part due to their unearned good 
fortune of living in a prosperous society, and a social safety net is a 
way of ensuring that this good fortune is shared among all those 
people who contribute to that society, and who are thereby 
deserving of some of this good fortune.  Here in summary form is 
the structure of my argument: 
 
1. A well-off individual’s economic prosperity requires a 
functioning social order.   
2. A functioning social order is a joint project of “We the People.”   
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3. A market social order without a publicly funded “social safety 
net” leaves some contributors to this joint project without 
secure access to a life of dignity.    
4. Citizens who contribute their part to this joint project deserve 
to share in the economic prosperity it creates, at least to the 
extent of having secure access to a life of dignity. 
5. It is an injustice for a person to lack what he or she deserves. 
──────────────────────────────────── 
6. Thus, absent a publicly funded safety net, a well-off individual’s 
economic prosperity comes at the expense of injustice to those 
at the bottom of society. 
 
This article will proceed by examining and defending the premises 
of this argument one by one.  It will end by considering and 
rebutting potential challenges to the argument. 
Premise 1:  A well-off individual’s economic prosperity 
requires a functioning social order. 
A person who lives apart from society in the manner of a Robinson 
Crusoe will not become wealthy.  Nor will a person who lives in a 
situation of significant societal breakdown—for instance, violent 
anarchy, civil war, widespread corruption, or any other situation in 
which stable and rule-governed social institutions (including 
government institutions) are lacking.  To ape the common quip 
that “It takes a village to raise a child,” we might also say that “It 
takes a social order to raise a fortune.” In truth, this is a point of 
elementary common sense, but it is a point that it is easy to 
overlook.  Thus, to make it as intuitively vivid as possible, I wish 
to consider a thought experiment that makes the point in dramatic 
fashion. 
The American social thinker E. J. James (who also served as 
president of the University of Illinois from 1904-1920) in 1886 
argued that society, in the form of the state, is always a silent 
partner in economic production, so that no one’s success is truly 
self-made.  His central idea was a “switched at birth” thought 
experiment, formulated thusly:  
To test the relative productivity of the state and the 
individual, compare the fortune accumulated by 
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might have accomplished had he been adopted 
when an infant by a family of Hottentots.1 
“Hottentots” referred to a pastoral people living in southern 
Africa, now more properly called the “Khoikhoi” people.  This 
thought experiment was not intended to disparage the people of 
southern Africa (though we must frankly admit it risks doing just 
that); it could have been formulated just as well in terms of any of 
a number of non-African societies.  Its point is simply that a 
wealthy person’s success is not all due to his or her own hard 
work.  Instead, even if a person’s tremendous wealth does come 
from hard work (and not from inheritance or nepotistic hiring, say), 
it is still a case of that person working hard within the matrix of 
opportunities that his or her society offers to its members, in the form of a 
peaceful and prosperous economic system.  Without that social 
input from society, an individual’s hard work would not produce 
such tremendous gains.  Thus, Cornelius Vanderbilt’s wealth was 
due to his own work plus the economic opportunities afforded him 
by the physical, educational and technological capital of the U.S., 
and most importantly of all, by the stable governing institutions in 
the U.S. 
Writing a generation later in his 1911 book Liberalism, the 
British philosopher L. T. Hobhouse expressed the same point as 
James.  It is worth quoting from Hobhouse at length, as I cannot 
improve on his words myself: 
[People] forget that without the organized force of 
society their rights are not worth a week’s 
purchase.  They do not ask themselves where they 
would be without the judge and the policemen and 
the settled order which society maintains. The 
prosperous business man who thinks that he has 
made his fortune entirely by self help does not 
pause to consider what single step he could have 
taken on the road to his success but for the 
tranquility which has made commercial 
development possible, the security by road and rail, 
and sea, the masses of skilled labour, and the sum 
of intelligence which civilization has placed at his 
1 Edmund J. James, “The State as an Economic Factor,” Science 
7:173 (1886), p. 488. 
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disposal, the very demand for the goods which he 
produces which the general progress of the world 
has created, the inventions which he uses as a 
matter of course and which have been built up by 
the collective efforts of generations of men of 
science and organizers of industry.  If he dug to the 
foundations of his fortune he would recognize that, 
as it is society that maintains and guarantees his 
possessions, so also it is society which is an 
indispensable partner in its original creation.2 
Given the obviousness of this point by James and Hobhouse, it 
would be surprising indeed if there were not others at other times 
who made this same point.  And indeed there are, past and present.  
A present quotation comes from Warren Buffet, who is the third 
richest person in the world in 2015, according to Forbes magazine.3  
In a television interview given in 1995, Buffet echoed James’s point 
from a century earlier by saying,  
I personally think that society is responsible for a 
very significant percentage of what I’ve earned. If 
you stick me down in the middle of Bangladesh or 
Peru or someplace, you find out how much this 
talent [viz., his investment skill] is going to produce 
in the wrong kind of soil.4 
The earlier quotation comes from Thomas Paine, an American 
“Founding Father” and political philosopher, who wrote the 
following in his 1797 pamphlet Agrarian Justice: 
2 L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism and Other Writings (James 




[accessed Sept. 28, 2015] 
4 “Warren Buffett Talks Business,” Center for Public Television, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1995.  Quoted at 
http://www.morethanmoney.org/articles.php?article=Wealth-
We-Didnt-Get-Here-On-Our-Own_330 [accessed Sept. 28, 2015] 
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Separate an individual from society, and give him 
an island or a continent to possess, and he cannot 
acquire personal property. He cannot be rich. So 
inseparably are the means connected with the end, 
in all cases, that where the former do not exist the 
latter cannot be obtained. All accumulation, 
therefore, of personal property, beyond what a 
man’s own hands produce, is derived to him by 
living in society; and he owes on every principle of 
justice, of gratitude, and of civilization, a part of 
that accumulation back again to society from 
whence the whole came.5 
Significantly for my purposes in this article, on the basis of the 
point just quoted, Paine recommends the construction of a tax-
funded social safety net, in the form of pensions for the elderly, 
disability support, and financial grants to young people to help 
them get started in life.   Moreover, he was one of the first thinkers 
to propose a feasible scheme for a social safety net, guaranteed as 
a matter of law rather than dependent on private acts of charity.  
The timing of this proposal was surely no accident, for Paine’s 
pamphlet appeared around the time that the then-new Industrial 
Revolution was beginning to influence social and political thought.  
(The first recorded usage of the phrase “Industrial Revolution” 
dates from 1799.6)  Paine was among the earliest thinkers to sense 
that then-current changes to the ways of economic production 
called for new forms of government.  He perceived that ideas of 
limited government which perhaps once made sense in an agrarian, 
largely pre-industrial America needed to give way to new ideas 
fashioned for a world containing multitudes of workers in 
industrial settings.   
5 Thomas Paine, Agrarian Justice (available online at 
https://www.ssa.gov/history/paine4.html) [accessed Sept. 28, 
2015]. 
6Roy Porter and Mikuláš Teich, The Industrial Revolution in National 
Context: Europe and the USA. (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). p. 45.   Quoted in Wikipedia, “Industrial 
Revolution” 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_Revolution) [accessed 
October 1, 2015]. 
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Paine’s insight has only grown more relevant, as we have 
moved even farther away from an economy of independent 
yeoman laborers working the soil.  It should now be clear that an 
individual’s prosperity depends not just on his or her own talents 
and effort, but also on such social factors as (1) the prevailing levels 
of education, technology, and wealth in one’s society; (2) the 
effectiveness of government at such tasks as safeguarding rights 
(including property rights), protecting the environment, stabilizing 
the economy (e.g. controlling the money supply), and investing in  
infrastructure (e.g. highways and utilities) and other public goods; 
and (3) the “cultural capital” of one’s society, that is, the 
internalized value system prizing cooperation and trust, which 
ensures that the daily interactions of millions of one’s fellow 
citizens are by and large peaceful.   
Premise 2: A functioning social order is a joint project of 
“We the People.”   
Constructing a functioning social order is no easy task.  Failed 
“state building” efforts in recent years in Iraq and Afghanistan hint 
at the difficulties.  Removing a tyrant is not enough; that is 
comparable to lancing a boil, whereas state building is more like 
evolving an entire organism.  A modern functioning social order 
typically involves millions of residents internalizing social rules and 
conventions in ways that mesh together to support stable and 
effective institutions—institutions that together define family 
relations, economic relations, and government relations (what John 
Rawls calls “the basic structure of society”).7  This is not to deny 
that institutions can be deliberately reformed or extended.  It is to 
say though that institutional reform or extension, when it happens 
successfully (e.g., the creation of Social Security in 1935), in all but 
the rarest of cases results from the actions of already existing social 
institutions (in particular, governing institutions).  Thus an 
“institutional infrastructure” is a vital element of a functioning 
social order.   
All of this suggests that it is a fantasy to believe, as self-styled 
“anarcho-capitalists” profess to believe, that large numbers of 
individuals pursuing their self-interest in the absence of 
7 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 1999), pp. 6-10. 
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authoritative social institutions could achieve a peaceful and 
prosperous co-existence.8  According to anarcho-capitalism, if a 
person has a need, then he or she will usually be willing to pay to 
have that need met, thus creating financial incentive for economic 
agents in a free market to supply the need, with the most efficient 
supplier reaping the largest financial rewards.  And since people 
need judicial services and security services, the anarcho-capitalist 
concludes that the free market will efficiently supply judicial and 
security services.  It is easy to see where this rosy picture goes 
wrong.  Among its many faults, one chief problem with anarcho-
capitalism is especially relevant to my purposes here.  This problem 
consists of the fact that multiple, competing firms are inimical to 
the effective and efficient delivery of judicial and security services.  
In the case of justice, a private judicial service firm will offer (for a 
fee, of course) to adjudicate disputes with reference to rules that 
the firm has developed.  This will be defective on two grounds:  
First, private firms’ judgments will too often lack impartiality 
(judgments are more likely to favor potentially higher-paying 
customers).  Second, and most crucially, the judgments will lack 
finality, since there will be multiple competing rule sets in sway in 
the society—potentially as many rule sets as there are competing 
judicial services firms.  In the case of security, the defect is even more 
obvious:  competing security firms may find it profitable to use 
violence against each other.  The problem in each case is that 
ultimately, each firm represents the interests of its owners (whether 
shareholders or private owners) first and foremost.  They do not 
represent We the People.   
In contrast to this dysfunctional anarcho-capitalist picture, 
according to which there is no such thing as society but rather just 
individuals pursuing their self-interest, a functioning social order 
exists because members of We the People internalize rules that lead 
them to restrain their pursuit of self-interest in countless ways.  
They support political institutions (by voting, paying taxes, 
fulfilling jury duty), they comply with the outcomes of political 
8 For some representative defenses of anarcho-capitalism, see 
Murray Rothbard, For a New Liberty:  The Libertarian Manifesto 
(Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1973); David D. Friedman, The 
Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism (Harper and Row, 
1973); and Michael Huemer, The Problem of Political Authority 
(Palgrave MacMillan, 2013).  
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institutions (policies, laws) even when alternative outcomes would 
have better promoted their interests; they settle disputes peacefully 
(albeit sometimes with the legal machinery of lawsuits); they are 
(within limits) willing to make sacrifices for the common good; they 
are willing to interact with strangers on a footing of mutual respect; 
and they are willing to pursue their own economic interests without 
theft or fraud or violence. Of course, there are those who violate 
these norms, but they are the exceptions against a background of 
widespread compliance.  Without such compliance—without the 
countless, daily contributions of social trust, social tolerance, 
concern for the common good, peaceful conflict resolution, and 
respect for law—a functioning social order is impossible.   
These essential contributions of present day fellow citizens are 
my reasons for saying a functioning social order is a joint project 
of “We the People.”  Additionally, let us note that “We the People” 
extends through time, to include one’s past and future fellow 
citizens.  It is not the case that each generation starts from scratch 
and creates its governing institutions anew.  Rather, each 
generation is bequeathed a set of institutions which it then adapts 
and/or builds upon.  This fact of past contributions of one’s fellow 
citizens, when set alongside the need for present day contributions 
of one’s fellow citizens, dramatically illustrates the truth of my 
claim that no one’s success is wholly self-made.9    
Premise 3:  A laissez-faire market social order without a 
publicly funded “social safety net” leaves some contributors 
to this joint project without secure access to a life of dignity.
   
Among the  jobs that need doing in the joint project of maintaining 
a social order are many low-skilled jobs:  shelves must be stocked, 
9 By contrast, of course, future citizens who do not yet exist are 
not causally responsible for one’s success (or for anything else!).  
However, so long as one wishes to be a steward of the social 
institutions that one has inherited—and not a mere exploiter of 
these institutions for one’s private gain—then one will recognize 
a duty of passing on healthy institutions to the next generation.  
This duty will include being sure that the next generation is 
capable of sustaining these institutions.  Part of the rationale of a 
social safety net is to assist in rearing the next generation so that it 
is thus capable. 
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floors cleaned, cash registers operated, bedpans emptied, hotel 
sheets changed, delivery vans driven, etc.  Without such jobs there 
would be no prosperous social order.  And yet, since low-skilled 
jobs are typically low-paid jobs, contributors who perform these 
jobs face the threat of poverty. Low-skilled jobs will not pay well, 
for the simple reason that many people have the skills to do the job, 
or can quickly learn them.  As a result, any given low-skilled 
employee is in a weak bargaining position; should he or she insist 
on high wages, the employer can simply hire someone else to do 
the job.  
This is a problem inasmuch as workers with low earnings will 
lack secure access to a life of dignity.  By a “life of dignity,” I mean 
a life of which the following are true: 
 
• You have adequate opportunity to meet your basic needs. 
• You have at least a tolerable degree of control over the shape 
of your life. 
• Your moral equality is recognized (there is no “second-class 
citizenship”). 
 
Admittedly, this is a rough and ready characterization.10  A full 
account of a life of dignity would of course have to specify what 
counts as “adequate opportunity” to meet your basic needs and 
what counts as a “tolerable degree of control” over the shape of 
your life.  (The latter notion is meant to signify that you have some 
significant control over key decisions:  what type of job you seek; 
where to call home; whether, when, and whom to marry; whether 
to have children, and if so, how many; what hobbies to pursue and 
what groups to join; what religion, if any, to espouse; what beliefs 
to hold and express; etc.) However, it is enough for my purposes 
that wherever the precise place to draw the two lines of “adequate 
opportunity” and “tolerable control” is located, trying to survive 
on the meager wages of a low-skilled job in a laissez-faire 
economy—which has no social safety net and no minimum wage 
10 For more details see Chapter 4 (“Democratic Liberalism: The 
Politics of Dignity”) of Craig Duncan and Tibor Machan, 
Libertarianism: For and Against (Lanham, MD: Roman and 
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laws—will be below one or both of those lines.11  And yet, as I 
noted earlier, these are jobs that must be done in any functioning 
social order. 
Premise 4:  Citizens who contribute their part to this joint 
project deserve to share in the economic prosperity it 
creates, at least to the extent of having secure access to a life 
of dignity. 
At the root of this premise is an ideal of reciprocity.  If you make 
a significant contribution to the functioning social order on which 
economic prosperity depends, then you deserve to share in that 
prosperity.  However, contributors who, despite their 
contributions, lack secure access to a life of dignity can hardly be 
said to be sharing in that prosperity.  Several comments are in order 
by way of further explanation.  First, I note that the word “access” 
in the formula “secure access to a life of dignity” is there for a 
reason.  This helps signify that some contribution to a functioning 
social order is expected; people who choose not to contribute are 
not to be handed a good life.  Instead people are to have access to a 
life of dignity, and one accesses this life by being willing to make a 
contribution.  This willingness will typically express itself in an 
actual contribution, though it will not always express itself thusly, 
as in the case of involuntary unemployment owing to, say, a 
recession or to disability.  
Second, rather than offer a general definition of what 
constitutes a “significant contribution” to a functioning social 
order—a difficult task that I lack the space here to perform 
adequately— I will continue my focus on low-wage workers and 
say this:  workers who are performing jobs that someone must 
do—jobs such as those listed earlier (stocking shelves, cleaning 
floors, driving delivery vans, etc.)—are by any reasonable standard 
making a necessary, and hence significant, contribution to a 
functioning social order.  This is even more obvious when one 
additionally takes into consideration non-economic contributions 
that citizens make in the form of behaviors mentioned earlier, such 
as displaying social trust, social tolerance, concern for the common 
11 For a concrete sense of the challenges faced by low-wage 
workers, consult David Shipler, The Working Poor: Invisible in 
America (Vintage, 2005) and Barbara Ehrenreich, Nickel and Dimed: 
On (Not) Getting By in America (Metropolitan Books, 2001).     
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good, peaceful conflict resolution, and respect for law.  
Furthermore, recall the point made earlier that much of society’s 
productive capital—its political and economic institutions, its 
buildings and roads, its cultural conventions and know-how—were 
created by past generations.  Thus, much of the income of current 
citizens is really a windfall from assets bequeathed to us by 
ancestors.  Surely a person who plays his or her part in “We the 
People” deserves a share of this inherited prosperity. 
Of course, the exact nature of moral desert is a matter of 
controversy.  My claims in the previous two paragraphs suppose 
that a person deserves economic reward in proportion to her 
contributions to the economy; let us call this the contributive account of 
desert.  Against this, a critic might claim that a person deserves 
economic rewards in proportion to her efforts to make a 
contribution.  Yet another critic might be skeptical of desert 
altogether, alleging that ideas of desert rest on untenable 
assumptions regarding free will and moral responsibility.  Rather 
than attempt to rebut these critics here, instead I will simply note 
that the contributive account of desert is much less congenial to 
the economic redistribution needed to fund a social safety net than 
the alternatives are (namely, the alternatives of the effort-based 
account of desert or desert-skepticism).  My assumption is that if 
the safety net can be demonstrated to be a requirement of justice 
even on the account of desert that is least hospitable to this 
conclusion, then the safety net is likely defensible on other 
accounts of desert as well.   
I say the contributive account of desert is the “least hospitable” 
account, since it is widely assumed that one’s earnings in a free 
market accurately reflect one’s contributions to the economy, and 
thus, a free market gives workers what they deserve, with no need 
for any redistribution.  More specifically, the idea is that whatever 
it is which you offer for sale, whether this be your labor itself or 
the products made with your labor, your earnings will be a function 
of the value that other people assign to that labor or those 
products.  The more that other people value these, the higher your 
earnings will be.  On this view, then, your earnings reflect the 
economic value you create.  Thus, your earnings reflect your 
economic contributions.  As a result, on this view, your earnings 
are your just deserts, and it is wrong for others to deprive you of 
your wages, e.g. in the form of coercive taxation.    
The problem with this view is its unduly narrow understanding 
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contribution to the economy as exclusively measured by the 
amount of money that wage-payers (i.e. the purchasers of a 
person’s labor) or product-purchasers are willing to pay.  The 
mistake this view makes is that it myopically focuses only on the 
final point of economic exchange (the sale of labor, or the sale of 
a product) while ignoring all the previous contributions required to 
sustain the larger system of economic exchange itself.  The 
mypopia takes two forms.  First, as I previously argued, the system 
of economic exchange exists only on account of the contributions 
of past generations (who created the institutional and physical 
capital on which the system depends) and on account of the 
present generations who respect the law, rear and educate the 
young, and generally trust and tolerate their fellow citizens.   
Second, wages are at best an imperfect measurement of 
contribution, even taking the system of economic exchange as a 
given.  I have in mind more than just the observation that from the 
fact, say, that a cigarette company executive makes many times 
more than even the most talented daycare worker, it does not 
follow that the executive’s contribution to society is therefore many 
times more as well.  Instead, what I have in mind is the fact that, 
first and foremost, wages reflect a laborer’s bargaining power rather 
than his or her contribution to production.  Consider for instance the 
case of a janitor in a firm.  The janitor’s contribution to the firm is 
significant, since working in a filthy environment would lower both 
morale and employee health and thereby in turn lower efficiency.  
However, the janitor’s wages are low on account of the fact that 
many other persons could do the employee’s job, so that the 
bargaining power of the janitor is low.  The mismatch between 
bargaining power and contribution is easy to see once we note that 
bargaining power varies with factors irrelevant to an employee’s 
contribution.  For instance, a spike in society’s unemployment rate 
can lower an employee’s bargaining power and thereby keep his or 
her wages lower than what they might have been in a better labor 
market (high unemployment makes the janitor easier to replace if 
he or she demands too much in the way of a raise).  If wages 
accurately measure contribution, then we have to say the janitor 
contributes less to the firm when unemployment is high in his or 
her society than when unemployment is low.  That is hardly 
plausible, however.  The janitor’s contribution to the firm remains 
constant throughout periods of low and high unemployment.    
In short, we should reject any simplistic equation between 
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economic contribution is employed—one that acknowledges the 
role of bargaining power in setting wages and one that 
acknowledges the larger social order in which economic exchanges 
of labor for wages are embedded—then we must conclude that the 
contributions of those at the bottom of society are much larger 
than initially they may appear to be.   On the contributive account 
of desert, it follows that those at the bottom of society are more 
deserving of economic reward than they may initially appear to be.  
I have suggested that at the very least they deserve secure access to 
a life of dignity, and that absent a publicly funded social safety net, 
this secure access is lacking.   
Premise 5:  It is an injustice for a person to lack what he or 
she deserves. 
I will be brief in my defense of this premise, since it draws on a 
long-standing picture of justice to which I will defer.  As Fred 
Feldman and Brad Skow write in their article on desert in The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “There is a long tradition 
according to which justice is fundamentally a matter of receipt in 
accord with desert. There are passages in the writings of Aristotle, 
Leibniz, Mill, Sidgwick, Ross and others in which this idea seems 
to be present.”12  They quote a particularly clear passage from John 
Stuart Mill expressing this idea: 
It is universally considered just that each person 
should obtain that (whether good or evil) which he 
deserves; and unjust that he should obtain a good, or 
be made to undergo an evil, which he does not 
deserve. This is, perhaps, the clearest and most 
emphatic form in which the idea of justice is 
conceived by the general mind.13 
12 Feldman, Fred and Skow, Brad, “Desert”, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.) 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/desert ) 
[accessed October 3, 2015] 
13 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2001 [1861]), p. 45. 
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Feldman and Skow note that in its classic and general form, this 
ideal of justice obtains when a person’s level of happiness matches 
his or her level of moral virtue.  This general ideal—which, being 
so general, we might refer to as “cosmic justice”—is in fact too 
general for my purposes.  My purposes require only a more specific 
notion of “socio-economic justice,” according to which justice 
obtains when a person’s socio-economic rewards match his or her 
socio-economic deserts.  Moreover, for purposes of this article, I 
have restricted my attention solely to economic rewards and 
deserts.14 
This finishes my defense of premises 1-5.  Putting these 
premises together yields my overall conclusion: 
 
Conclusion:  Absent a publicly funded safety net, a well-off individual’s 
economic prosperity comes at the expense of injustice to those at the bottom of 
society. 
 
Hence, a publicly funded safety net is a requirement of justice. 
Having completed my argument for my conclusion, I now turn in 
the remaining sections to considering and rebutting several 
objections to my argument. 
Objection 1: The taxes that fund a social safety net violate the 
property rights of those who are taxed. 
According to this objection, although the ends sought by a social 
safety net may be worthy ends, the means by which the safety net 
is funded are immoral. The means, of course, include the taxes that 
fund the safety net programs, and according to this objection, those 
means trespass on the property rights of those who are coerced to 
14 Public honors (e.g. artistic awards, Nobel prizes, presidential 
medals of freedom, etc.) that express social esteem are a form of 
non-economic social reward.  Moreover, it is important to note 
that there are non-economic contributions to society (e.g. 
childrearing—though of course childrearing is also indirectly an 
economic contribution insofar as caregivers are raising future 
workers/consumers).  A fuller discussion of social contribution 
and desert would need to include an exploration of unpaid 
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pay the taxes.  Accordingly, the objection concludes that those 
taxes are a type of theft, the illegitimate and forced confiscation of 
others’ property.   
Many replies to this objection are possible.  For starters, the 
objector needs to tell us whether all forms of taxation are forms of 
theft, even the taxes that pay for national defense, police 
protection, court of law, prisons, fire departments, and the like.  If 
those taxes are not theft, then the objector must explain why those 
taxes are legitimate and the taxes that fund a safety net are not.  In 
response, the objector may offer the following explanation: the 
national defense, the legal system, fire departments, etc., are 
programs that benefit all citizens.  Hence, the taxes that fund these 
programs are not redistributive taxes—taxes that take from some 
citizens and give to others.  It is redistributive taxes, the objector 
concludes, that represent a form of confiscation akin to theft. 
In reply to this, I will make two points.  First, I note that the 
social safety net is a form of social insurance, and as such, it does 
offer some benefit to all citizens.  No citizen should feel so 
absolutely invulnerable that the safety net is useless for him or her.  
Stock market crashes, recessions, natural disasters, disease and 
disabling accidents, and the like are, to some degree, risks to all of 
us.   It is true that you may never personally need the safety net, 
but then again, you may never personally need the fire department 
either.  What is more, in putting a floor to the deprivation you 
might experience, your bargaining power with potential employers 
is enhanced (no boss can say “Work for me or else face starvation 
while you are unemployed”), as is your ability to take 
entrepreneurial risks (since you need not fear destitution in the case 
of a failed business idea).   
Second, and more fundamentally, this objection ignores the 
fact that property rights are the creation of the social order—in this 
case, the law.  The money that you currently legally own is 
equivalent to the money in your possession minus the money that 
you legally owe to others.  Since taxes are among the money that 
you legally owe to others, taxes are not theft of your money.  
However, this reply—true though it is—leads immediately to a 
second objection. 
Objection 2: Even if safety net taxes don’t violate legal 
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The truth in this objection is that although the legal order defines 
property rights, some ways of defining property rights are morally 
superior to others.  In particular, if I have a pre-legal moral right to 
some property, but the law defines that property as belonging to 
others, then in a sense I have been morally robbed of that property, 
even though there has been no legal crime of theft.  The key 
question, then, is whether the taxes that fund a social safety net 
violate moral rights to property. 
The most plausible case for a moral right to the money that 
comes into one’s possession from market exchanges is a case 
rooted in desert.  According to this case, one deserves reward in 
proportion to one’s contributions to society, and one’s earnings in 
a laissez-faire market accurately reflect one’s social contributions.  
However, we saw in an earlier section that this is not so.  Earnings 
very often reflect a worker’s weak bargaining power rather than 
his/her true contribution to economic production.  And earnings 
do not take into account a worker’s contributions to what I earlier 
called a society’s “cultural capital,” namely, social trust and 
toleration, peaceful conflict resolution, respect for law.  On the flip 
side, high earnings can overestimate a person’s economic 
contributions, by ignoring the high-earner’s dependence on a 
functioning social order (which, we have seen, requires the inputs 
of many others besides himself), and by ignoring the past 
contributions of others in previous generations, who constructed 
key governing institutions, who built important physical capital 
(roads, buildings, etc.) and who pioneered important technological 
advances.   
One way to appreciate this point—and hence, to appreciate the 
absurdity of a person’s claiming that he personally deserves every 
penny that he comes to possess in market exchanges—is to 
compare yourself with a hardworking compatriot from 200 years 
ago.  You are almost surely much richer than he or she was.  But 
do you personally deserve these riches in a way your earlier 
compatriot did not?  How could you?  If you are ten times richer, 
are you ten times harder working?  Ten times more efficient?  Ten 
times more brilliant?  That is doubtful. Your extra riches are a 
windfall from your good fortune of living in a social order with 
greater cultural, technological, and physical capital than your early 
compatriot.  You deserve a portion of those riches, to the extent 
that you have indeed worked hard and offered a service or product 
that others value.  But to imagine that you personally deserve (and 
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market transactions is vastly to exaggerate your own productive 
inputs. 
Objection 3:  You are advocating socialism! 
This is a familiar objection in the American political context, where 
“socialism” is largely a term of abuse.  Without implying anything 
about the merits or demerits of socialism, let me simply say that the 
public social safety net I am advocating does not require socialism, 
understood in its proper sense.  In its proper sense, “socialism” 
refers to an economic system in which the means of production are 
collectively owned rather than privately owned, i.e. an economy 
consisting wholly of state-run or worker-run enterprises.  My 
argument is not committed to such a system.  Rather, my argument 
claims that our economic system should give due recognition to 
both individual and social inputs to wealth.  In this once again, I 
follow the lead of L. T. Hobhouse, who wrote, 
It is evident that these conceptions embody many 
of the ideas that go to make up the framework of 
Socialist teaching, though they also emphasize 
elements of individual right and personal 
independence, of which Socialism at times appears 
oblivious. The distinction I would claim for 
economic Liberalism is that it seeks to do justice to 
the social and individual factors in industry alike, as 
opposed to an abstract Socialism which emphasizes 
the one side and an abstract Individualism which 
leans its whole weight on the other.15 
I have sought in this article to show that the ideal of doing justice 
to both individual and social inputs to wealth creation requires a 
social safety net to ensure that all contributors have secure access 
to a life of dignity.  As the experience of many existing countries 
already attests, social safety nets are compatible with widespread 
private ownership of the means of production. 
15 Hobhouse, op. cit., p. 101. 
 
 
                                                 
17
Duncan: Of Fortunes and Fortune
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2014
18 
Objection 4:  Those who need a social safety net have a 
flawed work ethic, and thus a safety net only encourages 
more laziness. 
This is far too sweeping.  Many people who need safety net support 
are already working, and working hard (often at more than one 
job).  They are in need of safety net support owing to low wages, 
not laziness.   Moreover, it is insufficient to say that such workers 
should simply find a high-paying job, or to say that if they are 
unable to find a higher-paying job owing to a lack of skills, then 
they should have made better decisions while in school as youths.  
Saying these things is insufficient, since most low-paying jobs—
cleaning, stocking shelves, driving delivery trucks, working in a 
daycare center, etc.—are jobs that need doing.  Fellow citizens who 
are contributing to your prosperity by doing jobs that need doing 
deserve secure access to a life of dignity.     
Of course, not all people who need safety net services will be 
working; some will be unemployed.  However, it is erroneous for a 
critic to say, “If unemployed people really wanted to find a job, 
they could.  Thus, those who are unemployed are choosing not to 
contribute to society, and deserve nothing.”  This critic’s error lies 
not just in the fact that during economic recessions, there are many 
fewer jobs than job seekers.  That is indeed true, but it is also true 
that even in non-recessionary times there are not enough jobs to 
employ all job seekers.  After all, an economy in which there were 
jobs for all job seekers would be an economy with an 
unemployment rate of zero.  By design, however, a zero rate of 
unemployment cannot occur in modern economies.  For if the 
national unemployment rate dips below what economists call the 
“non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment” (NAIRU) then 
the central bank (in the U.S., the Federal Reserve) will raise interest 
rates in effort to slow down the economy and increase the 
unemployment rate, so as to tame the threat of inflation.  (An 
inflationary spiral threatens to arise with very low unemployment, 
since in such a case workers’ pay rises as employers compete with 
one another to hire new employees, and workers’ rising pay in turn 
lead businesses to raise product prices to recoup the added labor 
costs, which leads to demands for further pay raises from workers, 
and so on.)  In other words, in modern economies a significant 
level of unemployment (typically between 4-5%) is deliberately 
maintained by central banks as means of preventing inflation.  Thus 
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involuntarily unemployed and in need of social safety net 
assistance.  
Thus the critic of the safety net is wrong to claim that only 
those who lack a work ethic need a social safety net.  That said, we 
should acknowledge that some level of welfare fraud exists, and the 
few who are guilty of it are rightly prosecuted.  Along with 
acknowledging this fact, however, we should also acknowledge 
how stereotypes of welfare recipients exaggerate levels of fraud and 
levels of dependency.  A myth-free approach will rely on evidence 
rather than emotion when discussing welfare fraud and 
dependency, and will also recognize that a number of safety 
programs serve populations who are non-poor (examples of such 
programs include public education, financial aid for higher 
education, Social Security, and efforts to make health care more 
affordable for the middle class).16   
Objection 5:  Let’s leave social assistance to private charity, 
not government. 
This objection agrees that a social safety net is morally important, 
but insists that safety net assistance should be provided by 
voluntary charitable contributions, not the government.  I have 
written at greater length elsewhere on this topic, so let me here 
simply summarize my response to this objection.17   First, charitable 
donations are likely to be too low to supply the needed assistance, 
especially since the times when aid is most needed, such as during 
an economic recession, are also times when donation levels are 
16 For some of this evidence see the linked-to studies in Eduado 
Porter,  “The Myth of Welfare’s Corrupting Influence on the 
Poor,” The New York Times, October 20, 2015. 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/business/the-myth-of-
welfares-corrupting-influence-on-the-poor.html) [accessed 
December 2, 2015];  and see Ann C. Foster and William R. Hawk, 
“Spending patterns of families receiving means-tested 
government assistance,” Beyond the Numbers 2:26 (December 
2013) ( http://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-2/spending-
patterns-of-families-receiving-means-tested-government-
assistance.htm) [accessed December 2, 2015].  
17 “In Defense of the Social Safety Net,” Think 38:13 (Autumn 
2014), pp. 25-37. 
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likely to be at their lowest.   However, the worry remains even in 
non-recessionary times.  According to the latest data from the U.S. 
Census Bureau, for instance, more than one in five Americans in 
2012 received some kind of aid from a means-tested government 
program.18 It is hard to imagine such levels of private aid being 
donated and coordinated effectively.  Second, recall that the goal 
of the social safety net is to grant citizens secure access to a life of 
dignity.  A person who is dependent on private charitable 
donations to achieve a dignified existence can hardly be said to 
have secure access to a life of dignity, even if the charitable funds 
happen to be enough to meet his or her needs for the time being.  
Finally, making the poor and lower-middle class dependent for 
their needs on the charity of the rich is itself an insult to the dignity 
of those who are dependent in this fashion.  For in such a case, 
despite being contributors to the functioning social order on which 
the prosperity of the wealthy depends, these people would be made 
to live at the whims of those at the top of the economic ladder, 
who doubtless look down on them with pity at best, and contempt 
at worst.  In all these ways, then, a threadbare and private social 
safety net would fail to grant citizens the secure access to a life of 
dignity that they deserve. 
Conclusion 
I conclude with a brief summary of my argument.  Picking up on a 
theme of L. T. Hobhouse’s, I have argued that just compensation 
must acknowledge both individual and social inputs to wealth 
creation.  In particular, prosperity requires a functioning social 
order that is no single person’s making, but instead requires the 
18 Shelley K. Irving and Tracy A. Loveless, “Dynamics of 
Economic Well-Being: Participation in Government Programs, 





) [accessed December 2, 2015].  Note that the official dates of the 
“Great Recession” are December 2007—June 2009, according to 
the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(http://www.nber.org/cycles.html) [accessed December 6, 2015].   
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contributions of a vast number of persons.  Those who play by the 
rules and contribute to this social order deserve, at the very least, 
secure access to a life of dignity.  This in turn requires social safety 
net programs, so that those who suffer from low wages and 
inauspicious social circumstances still have secure access to a life 
of dignity.  Objections to this view stem from a number of sources:  
from a conception of property rights that is flawed by a blindness 
to the social factors upon which property wealth depends; from 
uncritical belief-sets that exaggerate levels of safety net abuse and 
that fail to distinguish between socialism, properly understood, and 
public assistance to those in need; and from unrealistic 
expectations of private charity’s ability to replace social safety 
programs.  Once these misguided assumptions are rebutted, a 
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